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ARVID G. ANDERSON et al., Respondents, v. JOHN J. 
SOUZA et al., Appellants. 
[1] Landlord and Tenan1r-Liability for Injuries to Third Persons. 
-A landlord is not responsible to other parties for the mis-
conduct or injurious acts of his tenant to whom his estate has 
been leased for a lawful and proper purpose when there is 
no nuisance or illegal structure on it at the time of the leasing. 
[2] Aeronautics- Airports- Operation of Property.-Evidence 
that owner of land constructed airfield, obtained a county 
permit, used the field for his own private plane, controlled 
the hangars and tie-down space from which he collected rent, 
and that lessee operated a flying school, sold gas and repaired 
planes, sustains finding that both owner and lessee operated 
a private airport. 
[3] !d.-Airports-Ownership and Operation of Airplanes.-Tes-
timony of owner of airport land that he owned and operated 
a plane and lessee's testimony that he owned and operated 
four airplanes, plus one which he operated for another owner, 
sustains finding that "many airplanes" operating from the air-
port were owned and operated by the landowner and lessee. 
[ 4] Witnesses-Refreshing Recollection-Use of Memorandum.-
A witness may read from a memorandum which constitutes 
a permanent record of a series of incidents observed by him 
over a long period of time respecting which he made notations 
in various forms at the time of each happening and which he 
later copied in a permanent form in the memorandum in ques-
tion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2047.) 
[5] !d.-Refreshing Recollection-Sufficiency of Memorandum.-
When a witness testified under oath that he made a copy of 
something, such testimony is equivalent to a statement that 
the copy was correctly made as it would not be a copy if it were 
not correct. 
[6] !d.-Refreshing Recollection-Use of Memorandum.-A wit-
ness may testify from a writing, though he retain no recollec-
tion of the particular facts, when the writing was prepared 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 150; Am.Jur., Landlord 
and Tenant, §§ 755, 762. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, § 316; [2, 3, 
8, 10-13, 17-22, 24] Aeronautics, § 5; [ 4, 6, 7] Witnesses, § 113; 
[5] Witnesses, § 115; [9] Injunctions, § 27; [14, 23] Aeronautics, 
§ 1.1; [15] Nuisances, § 32; [16] Nuisances,§ 60. 
I 
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by him, or under his direction, at the time when the fact oc-
curred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when 
the fact was fresh in his memory, and he knew that the same 
was correctly stated in the writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2047.) 
[7] !d.-Refreshing Recollection-Use of Memorandum.-Where 
a memorandum fails to refresh the recollection of a witness, 
there is only one way in which he can testify "from the writ-
ing" and that is by reading it verbatim. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2047.) 
[8] Aeronautics-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief 
may be granted to property owners contiguous to an airport 
where the damages for annoyance and disturbance caused 
by low flying airplanes cannot be measured. ( Civ. Code, 
§ 3422.) 
[9] Injunctions- Grounds for Relief- Irreparable Injury.-'rhe 
term "irreparable injury" authorizing the interposition of a 
eourt of equity by way of injunction means that species of 
damages, whether great or small, which ought not to be sub-
mitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other. 
[10] Aeronautics- Airports- Operation as Nuisance.- Finding 
that operation of airport and usual and normal flight of incom-
ing and outgoing planes constitutes a continuing private nui-
sance to adjacent prior residents of the immediate area is 
supported by evidence that there are from 50 to 150 flights 
daily; that the planes in taking off and in landing are very low, 
some of thPm 10 to 20 feet above the ground as they approach 
or leave the landing strip; that the noise has destroyed the 
peace of the adjacent homes making it impossible to get ade-
quate sleep, drowning out normal conversation, and making 
it impossible to use the radio or the telephone; and that the 
noise and low flights combined have frightened children to an 
hysterical extent, have scared the women, making them 
nervous and impaired their health. 
[11] !d.-Airports-Operation as Nuisance.-An airport is not a 
nuisance per se, but it may be a nuisance because of unsuitable 
location or improper operation or both. (State Aeronautics 
Com. Act, § 2(d); 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 151a.) 
[12] Id.- Airports- Injunctive Relief.- Since injunctive proc-
esses are prospective in operation, legislatiop regulating the 
establishment and operation of airfields and declaring the 
public policy with respect to aviation is applicable to a suit, 
pending but undecided on the date of the legislative enact-
ment, wherein it was sought to enjoin continued operation of 
[11] Airport or flight of aircraft as a nuisance, note, 140 A.L.R. 
1362. See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Aircraft, § 4; Am.Jur. (rev. ed.) 
Aviation, § 29. 
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an airport on the ground that it was a private nuisance, and 
the scope and nature of any injunction in that case will be 
limited by such legislation. 
[13] Id.-Airports-Licensing.-The licensing of an airport by 
the State Aeronautics Commission does not confer the right 
so to operate the airport as to constitute a private nuisance 
to surrounding property owners. 
[14] Id.-Rights in Airspace and in Surface of SoiL-Owners of 
surface of soil are not divested of the lawful rights incident 
to such ownership by reason of the declaration of Congress 
that United States possesses and exercises complete and ex-
clusive national sovereignty in the air above the United States 
(49 U.S.C.A. § 176a), nor by the declaration of the state Legis-
lature that sovereignty in the space above the lands rests in 
the state except where gTanted to and assumed by the United 
States pursuant to constitutional grant from the people of 
the state. (State Aeronautics Com. Act, § 2(b); 1 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 151a.) 
[15] Nuisances- Equitable Relief-Abatement.-Regulatory pro-
visions of State Aeronautics Commission Act (1 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 151a) and federal laws regulating flying and 
airports (49 U.S.C.A. § 176a) do not supplant the ancient 
common law and long-established statute law declaring that 
nuisances may be abated at the suit of those injured thereby. 
[16] !d.-Equitable Relief-Scope.-Injunctive process ought not 
to go beyond the necessities of the case and where a legitimate 
business is being eonducted and in the conduct thereof a nui-
sance is created and being maintained, the relief granted 
should be directed and confined to elimination of the nuisance, 
unless under the peculiar circumstances of the case the busi-
ness, lawful in itself, cannot be conducted without creating 
a nuisance and violating the rights of contiguous property 
owners. 
[17] Aeronautics-Airports-Nature.-Establishment of a private 
airport does not require a finding by any public agency of 
public convenience and necessity. 
[18] Id.- Airports- Mode of Conducting Business.-A private 
airfield, having no power of condemnation, cannot conduct 
its business in such a manner as to deprive others of their 
property rights and thereby, in practical effect, condemn the 
property of others in violation of constitutional guarantees. 
[19] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-Notwithstanding the pub-
lic policy encouraging the establishment and operation of air-
ports and the furtherance of aviation, the operation of a pri-
[15] See Cal.Jur., Nuisances, § 39; Am.Jur., Nuisances, § 146. 
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vate airport is a private business and, like any other private 
business, operations which create a nuisance may be enjoined. 
[20] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-In the absence of evidence 
that airplanes cannot fly to and from a private airport at 
sufficient altitude to eliminate the nuisance of low flying with 
its resultant noise and danger to adjacent residential property 
owners, an injunction to cease operations of the. field cannot 
be sustained on findings that a private continuing nuisance 
exists by reason of the low flying of incoming and outgoing 
airplanes with attendant noise and danger. 
[21] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-In action to enjoin opera-
tion of an airport on ground that its operation constitutes 
a nuisance, burden is on plaintiffs to prove that no planes 
could fly to and from the airfield at proper elevations. 
[22] Id.- Airports-Rights of Contiguous Owners.-Contiguous 
property owners must to a reasonable degTee yield their desired 
privacy to the general welfare which is contributed to by the 
legitimate operation of a private airport. 
[23] !d.-Rights in Airspace and in Surface of SoiL-Where it is 
shown that a runway is too short to permit airplanes to 
descend over contiguous property without invading the lawful 
right of the surface owner to the air above his holdings, the 
flights constitute unlawful acts. 
[24] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-An injunction forbidding 
all operations from a private airport cannot be sustained unless 
it is shown that the imposition of appropriate limitations will, 
by reason of the shortness of the runway and the prevailing 
flying conditions, make it impossible for the airfield to be 
operated in a normal and usual manner. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stan-
islaus County. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part with directions. 
Action for damages for maintenance of nuisance through 
operation of an airport, and for injunctive relief. Judgment 
for plaintiffs reversed as to plaintiffs C. H. Terry, Oma Terry, 
H. B. Fletcher, Dorothy Fletcher, \Villiam T. Harrison, Grace 
Harrison, Frank Baba and Zale Wooters; part of judgment 
awarding damages affirmed as to other plaintiffs; part of 
judgment enjoining defendants from operating airport re-
versed with directions. 
Donald B. Fowler and H. E. Gleason for Appellants. 
Brown, Brown & Bacon, Ralph M. Brown, William E. Bacon 
and T. M. Norton for Respondents. 
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THE COURT.-This appeal is from a judgment enjoining 
the operation of an airport and awarding damages. After 
decision by the District Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, a hearing was granted by this court to give further 
consideration to the important issues involved. We have 
concluded that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, 
prepared by Mr. Justice Van Dyke, correctly discussed and 
decided the issues presented. That opinion, with additions 
and deletions, is adopted as the opinion of this court. As 
modified, the opinion is as follows : 
"Plaintiffs below, more than 50 in number, brought this 
action against defendants to recover damages by reason of 
the alleged creation and maintenance of a nuisance through 
the operation of an airport, and for injunctive relief forbid-
ding the defendants to operate the airport as such. The 
court, adopting in the main the allegations of the complaint, 
made the following findings of fact: That since April 19, 
1946, plaintiffs were the owners of and resided on real prop-
erty located close to the airport; that during that period of 
time the defendants operated the airport, defendants Souza 
and wife being the owners of the real property on which the 
airport is located; that in the course of the operation of the 
airport numerous aircraft of various types taxi, take off, 
circle, buzz, cruise about, maneuver, glide, climb, bank, turn, 
stunt and engage in acrobatics, and land on, from, and to 
said airport; that this aerial activity is continuous and fre-
quent throughout the daylight hours and that the aircraft are 
operating with the consent, encouragement and solicitation 
of the defendants; that many of the airplanes so operated 
belong to defendants and are operated by them; that the air-
planes fly over the homes of the plaintiffs at heights varying 
from 25 to 800 feet and in passing over or near said homes 
create such a tremendous noise that the same interferes with 
the lawful use, enjoyment and occupancy of the dwellings 
to the great disturbance and nervous upset of the plaintiffs; 
that because of said noises plaintiffs and members of their 
families are unable to sleep when planes from the airport 
are operating, to their great physical detriment and mental 
anguish ; that normal conversation is interrupted; that plain-
tiffs have great difficulties listening to radio programs and in 
general the enjoyment of their homes is material1y decreased; 
that plaintiffs, knowing that numerous airplane accidents 
have occurred throughout the country and that several have 
830 ANDERSON v. SouzA [38 C.2d 
occurred at the airport, suffer great fear and apprehension 
when the airplanes pass over their homes at low altitudes; 
that defendant Earlandson operates a flying school at the 
airport, and the student pilots using airplanes belonging to 
Earlandson fly at low altitudes over plaintiffs' homes, but 
that only six plaintiffs were affected by the conduct of the 
student pilots and that, as to the six, such conduct placed 
their lives and property in great jeopardy and caused them 
to fear greatly for their property, their lives and the lives 
of their loved ones; that the real property of the same six 
plaintiffs by reason of said conditions has depreciated in 
value, but that this was not true as to the other plaintiffs; 
that plaintiffs have often requested and demanded of defend-
ants that they cease operating the airport and the airplanes 
in the manner found, but that defendants have continued to 
operate them in said manner continuously from April, 1946, 
to the time of trial; that more airplanes are operating from 
the field each month and that still more airplanes will oper-
ate from the field in the future ; that defendants by their 
acts have caused irreparable injury to plaintiffs and that 
irreparable injury will be done to them in the future if the 
defendants continue with their acts as found; that none of 
the plaintiffs have been damaged except the same six and 
that they have been damaged as follows, V. E. Anderson 
and wife jointly in the sum of $500, Arvid G. Anderson and 
wife jointly in the same sum, and Jack Harlan and wife 
jointly in the same sum ; that plaintiffs have no plain, speedy 
or adequate remedy at law. As conclusions of law from the 
facts found judgment was ordered: 1. Enjoining and re-
straining the defendants from operating the airport on the 
premises described in the complaint; 2. For damages in the 
sum of $500 to each of the three couples named above. Judg-
ment was entered accordingly. Motion for new trial was made 
and denied. From the judgment the defendants have taken 
this appeal. 
"vVe shall discuss the contentions of appellants seriatim 
as they advance them in their briefs. Appellants first attack 
the finding of the court that appellants Souza and wife, along 
with appellant Earlandson, operate the airport. Herein it 
is claimed on behalf of Souza that it is Earlandson who oper-
ates the airport and that Souza, while he owns the property 
where the airport is located, has leased the airport to Earland-
son, and that, therefore, under such cases as Gould v. Stafford, 
91 Cal. 146 [27 P. 543], Wiersma v. City of Long Beach, 
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41 Cal.App.2d 8 [106 P.2d 45], Mundt v. Nowlin, 44 Cal. 
App.2d 414 [112 P.2d 782], and Meloy v. C·ity of Santa Mon-
ica, 124 Cal.App. 622 [12 P.2d 1072], the nuisance complained 
of is created and maintained by Earlandson alone. [1] These 
cases lay down the well-known rule that a landlord is not 
responsible to other parties for the misconduct or injurious 
acts of his tenant to whom his estate has been leased for a 
lawful and proper purpose when there is no nuisance or ille-
gal structure upon it at the time of the leasing. [2] We 
think, however, that in view of the evidence here this rule 
and the cases declaring it are not controlling, for it was 
shown that Souza owned the land, constructed the field, ob-
tained the county permit, flew his own plane from and to 
the field and retained portions of the field's facilities, that is, 
the hangars and tie-down space for which he collected rent. 
Earlandson 's rights were to operate his flying school, sell 
gas and repair planes. Earlandson, therefore, was not in 
sole charge of the field and it is a fair inference from the 
evidence that Souza at least joined with Earlandson in per-
mitting public use of the field, and, in short, so participate~ 
in the operation of the field that the court's findings that he 
1 
and Earlandson operated the field are substantially supported j 
by the evidence. , / 
[3] "There is next attacked the finding that 'many air-
planes' operating from the airport were owned and operated 
by appellants Souza and Earlandson as being contrary to the 
evidence. We think this finding is sufficiently supported by 
Souza's testimony that he owned and operated a plane and 
by Earlandson's testimony that he owned and operated four 
airplanes, plus one which he operated for another owner. 
\Vhether such numbers constitute many or few is a compara-
tive matter, but Earlandson 's planes were shown to have 
been greatly used in the conduct of his air school and in view 
of the fact of dual control and operation of the port by the 
two men we find nothing erroneous in the challenged find-
ing .... 
"Appellants contend that the court erred in decreeing any 
judgment either for damages or by way of injunctive relief 
against defendant Souza. This is but another aspect of the 
contention previously discussed, which was based upon the 
theory that Souza, having leased the airport, did not operate 
the same, and we think separate treatment is unnecessary. 
·what we have said heretofore disposes of this contention. 
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[4] "Appellants contend that the court erred in allow-
ing one of the respondents to testify from and read verbatim 
into the record a memorandum he had prepared without re-
quiring, as they contend, a proper foundation therefor to be 
laid. It appears that the length of time covered by the testi-
mony taken was quite considerable, in fact, several years in 
extent. The witness had from time to time over a consider-
able period of time and on observing airplanes flying low over 
his home or near to it and over his property made notations 
in whatever way was open to him at the time, consisting of a 
description of the plane, its numbers and such like matters. 
He made these notations on scratch paper he may have had 
with him at the time. Sometimes he entered them upon fence 
posts and even at times inscribed them on the surface of 
the ground. He then collected these memoranda and, as he 
testified, copied the same into more permanent form and 
either from these latter writings or from other writings 
copied from them in turn, he was permitted to testify over 
objections. Section 204 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure covers 
the matter. It provides that a witness is allowed to refresh 
his memory by anything written by himself or under his 
direction at the time when the fact occurred or immediately 
thereafter or while still fresh in his memory, if he knows 
the same to be correctly stated in the writing. He may also 
testify from a writing, though he retain no recollection as to 
the facts, but such evidence must be received with caution. . . . 
[5] ''An examination of the record discloses that the wit-
ness here did make the notations himself and he testified that 
he made copies of these notations. He was not asked directly 
either on direct or cross-examination whether he copied them 
correctly, but when a witness testifies under oath that he made 
a copy it is going far afield to say that such testimony is not 
equivalent to saying that he copied the memoranda correctly 
since it would not be a copy unless it was correct. While it 
is better, of course, to properly and fully qualify the witness 
who is to testify from or with the aid of memoranda, never-
theless we do not think that what happened here would jus-
tify reversal if, indeed, error at all was committed. [6] As 
to his reading the memoranda into the record, that is per-
mitted when the code says: 'So, also, a witness may testify 
from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the 
particular facts.' [7] Where proper foundation has been 
laid the fact that the writing does not refresh the recollection 
of the witness does not prevent him from testifying from the 
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writing and if his recollection is not refreshed there would be 
no other way to testify 'from the writing' save to read from 
it verbatim.'' 
The record does not indicate where the following plaintiffs 
reside: C. H. Terry, Oma Terry, H. E. Fletcher, Dorothy 
Fletcher, William 'r. Harrison, and Grace Harrison. The 
judgment as to them must therefore be reversed. The judg-
ment must also be reversed as to plaintiffs Frank Baba and 
Zale Wooters, who testified that they had not authorized 
institution of this action in their names. 
Of the 56 plaintiffs, only six testified at the trial. The 
court denied defendants' motion to nonsuit the plaintiffs who 
did not testify. The conditions described by the plaintiffs' 
witnesses were common to· all plaintiffs who lived in the 
immediate vicinity of the airport. The testimony was re-
ceived in behalf of all the plaintiffs. The six who testified 
were the plaintiffs' witnesses and the fact that these wit-
nesses were themselves plaintiffs did not limit the benefit 
of their testimony to themselves alone. The conditions they 
were describing were to some extent common to all the plain-
tiffs since it described conditions such as low fl.ying, stunting, 
indulging in acrobatics and the like which would affect those 
residents in the immediate vicinity of the airport and there 
was testimony that placed the other plaintiffs within that 
radius. 
In addition to the injunction abating operation of the air-
port, the trial court awarded the Harlans, the Arvid Ander-
sons, and the Vern Andersons damages of $500 per couple 
for the annoyance and discomfort caused by defendants' oper-
ations before the institution of the action. Defendants con-
tend that these damages are unsupported by the evidence. The 
testimony of the Harlans and Andersons, which is set out in 
detail below, is clearly sufficient to support the awards in their 
favor. (See Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 
168, 172 [106 P. 581, 21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 183]; 
Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal.App.2d 778, 787-788 [214 P.2d 50].) 
The trial court awarded these three couples $500 each for 
past injuries, but found that all the plaintiffs had suffered 
irreparable injury and were entitled to injunctive relief. 
Even though the decree must be reversed as to some plaintiffs, 
the findings are not necessarily inconsistent. The plaintiffs 
receiving money damages were the only plaintiffs to give 
testimony. [8] The annoyance and disturbance caused by 
38 C.2d-27 
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low flying airplanes is very difficult to measure. The other 
plaintiffs could be injured by the airplanes sufficiently to 
justify equitable relief, even though their damages could not 
be measured. By definition, an injunction is properly granted 
where "it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount 
of compensation which would afford adequate relief.'' ( Civ. 
Code, § 3422.) [9] The term "irreparable injury" author-
izing the interposition of a court of equity by way of injunc-
tion means that species of damages, whether great or small, 
that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted 
on the other. (Edelman Bros. v. Baikof!, 277 Ill.App. 432. 
See, also, Greenfield v. Board of City Planning Commrs., 
6 Cal.App.2d 515, 518 [45 P.2d 219]; Espenscheid v. Bauer, 
235 Ill. 172 [85 N.E. 230, 232] .) 
"The final contention made by the appellants is that the 
court erred in restraining defendants from operating an air-
port on the premises described in the complaint. This con-
tention presents a difficult problem and to its discussion a 
fuller statement of facts than has heretofore been made is 
desirable. The defendant Souza owned 42 acres of land within 
one mile of the limits of Turlock. In 1946 he discussed with 
federal authorities the suitability of this land as an airport 
site. Encouraged by what he was told, he proceeded to lay out 
a landing strip and by locating a strip diagonally was able 
to achieve an airstrip 2,000 feet in length, just 200 feet 
beyond the minimum permitted by the United States Civil 
Aeronautics Administration. He constructed a strip 300 
feet wide, oiling and smoothing the surface of the ground. 
Along the southerly line of his property and at the southerly 
end of the strip was a public road. The property bounding 
his property on the north was owned by the Andersons, their 
son and his wife, and the Harlans. A great deal of testimony 
concerning the location of the homes of these respondents 
and the location thereof with regard to the airport was given, 
along with the use of a map .... One of the Anderson couples 
does not reside near the airport, but owns an interest in the 
property of the other Anderson couple. The Anderson home 
is about 500 feet from the northern boundary of the strip 
and about 250 feet from the center line of the strip as ex-
tended. The Harlan house is about 500 feet from the northern 
end of the strip and about 300 feet distant from the same 
center line. North of the Anderson and Harlan properties 
and 660 feet from the north line of the airfield there is another 
public road. The public roads mentioned parallel the north 
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and south boundaries of the airfield. Some of the plaintiffs 
reside northerly of this northernmost road. Bounding a part 
of the Souza property on the west there is another public 
road across which lie the residences and property of some of 
the other respondents. Others bound the field on the east. On 
the southerly road defendants had signs directed to vehicular 
traffic on the road reading as follows: One sign read, 'Stop, 
Aircraft Crossing.' There were two of these stop signs, ap-
parently placed to warn vehicular traffic going in either direc-
tion upon the road. Between them was a sign reading, 'No 
Parking Between Signs-Look Out for Low-Flying Aircraft.' 
A sign directed to aircraft in this same vicinity read, 'All 
Aircraft Keep 20 to 30 Feet Above the Road.' There is con-
siderable evidence that these warnings were appropriate and 
that aircraft, in fact, flew over this road onto the airstrip 
at elevations even below the 20 to 30 feet which the sign 
requested. The airstrip runs approximately north and south; 
the generally-prevailing wind is from the north and hence 
most craft take off in that direction and on the other hand, 
and for the same reason, generally land from the south. 
As a part of his construction of the airport Souza invested 
altogether in land and buildings some $80,000. The value of 
the homes and residences of the respondents was not the sub-
ject of testimony. Although no considerable complaint seems 
to have been made while the airport was being constructed, 
the opposition and complaints began very shortly after the 
field was put in operation. The homes of the respondents 
were there before the airport was constructed. A flight pat-
tern was laid out, after consultation with the federal authori-
ties, which may be briefly described as follows: A plane 
taking off into a north wind would rise from the strip and 
fly over the property beyond its limits until it reached an 
elevation of approximately 500 feet, at which time it would 
turn to the west at a right angle, then turn at a right angle 
south, again turn at a right angle east and then make a land-
ing on the airstrip from the south. The pattern was approxi-
mately rectangular. A similar pattern would be followed 
when a south wind was blowing and the planes took off toward 
the south, this pattern being the reverse of the one just de-
scribed. Planes desiring to leave the pattern would make the 
first right angle turn and then proceed away from the pattern 
as desired. Incoming planes would fly into the pattern and 
follow it to a landing. There apparently was no restriction 
as to the size or type of aircraft permitted to use the field 
836 ANDERSON v. SouzA [38 0.2d 
and although the airfield was privately owned, nevertheless, 
it was available to the flying public. At frequent intervals 
planes belonging to business enterprises would arrive and 
depart from the field in pursuit of their private concerns. 
Souza testified that there were approximately 18 to 20 planes 
hangared or tied down at the field as a fair average. The 
testimony as to the frequency of flight ran all the way from 
150 flights per day down to 40 or 50. Most of this flying was 
during the daytime, beginning around 6 o'clock in the morn-
ing and continuing into the evening, but there were appar-
ently no time limitations and planes would arrive and depart 
during the night, makeshift landing lights being provided. 
It appears that a light plane taking off to the north would 
become airborne well before reaching the end of the runway. 
A heavier plane would make a longer run and would sometimes 
pass between the Harlan and Anderson homes with little alti-
tude. Supportive of the court's findings that a nuisance ex-
isted, in addition to what we have already referred to, we 
select the following testimony which, although contradicted 
to some extent by witnesses for appellants, yet must here 
be taken to be true. [10] Mrs. Neva Harlan testified that 
45 or 50 planes used the field daily, many of them flying low 
over her home ; that she was unable to rest during the day 
because of the disturbance; that the noise was so loud she 
could not understand normal conversation or hear the radio 
or use the telephone when the planes went over; that night 
flying awakened her; that the planes kept the family awake 
and so upset they could not get back to ·sleep after being 
awakened; that the children were awakened early in the morn-
ing; that when friends visited the noise drowned out conver-
sation. Arvid Anderson, who resided away from the airfield, 
but owned an interest in his son's property bordering the 
field on the north, was accustomed to work about the 10-acre 
farm, of which it consisted. He testified that as he worked 
the planes sometimes made him so jumpy he had to leave ; 
that he had to be on the constant lookout because they came in 
so low that it was really dangerous; that once while running 
a tractor a plane came in so low that he rolled off the tractor 
because he was sure it was going to strike him; that once a 
plane zoomed over him so low that he put his pitchfork up 
and felt sure the fork would hit the plane; that he had noticed 
planes crossing from the airfield over his property at heights 
of 10, 15 or 20 feet; that some of the lighter planes went 
higher, but he had seen the larger planes skim the top of 
Apr.1952] ANDERSON v. SouZA 
[38 C.2d 825; 243 P.2d 497) 
837 
the 6-foot fence posts along his southern boundary; that while 
he had wanted to put a home for himself on the place he 
could not do it and could not use the place for poultry or 
turkeys because of the low flying; he was afraid to live on 
the place. Irene Anderson, who lived in the An~erson home, 
testified that she had made a count of the planes flying over 
on certain dates; that on May 15, 1948, just before the case 
was tried, 110 came over, on May 16th, 105, on Saturday, 
May 22d, 101, on Sunday, May 23d, 140; that during week-
days there would be 50 a day; that flights generally began at 
6 o'clock and continued until dark; that the planes greatly 
affected her enjoyment of her home and family life, made her 
nervous, gave her digestive upsets, scared the children. She 
said 'We are just helpless, we don't have a home, we are 
without anything, nothing to fight for; we are just helpless 
where we are; it has just been Hell'; that she could not 
enjoy radio programs because of the continual noise; that she 
couldn't use the telephone, nor enjoy the visits of guests 
or relatives. She said 'When they come there to see us it is 
Zoom! Zoom! Zoom! just like that, all the time'; that she 
was awakened early in the morning and when awakened at 
night could not get to sleep again; that she had no rest and 
had no peace at all; that the children were scared many times 
until they were hysterical and would run into the house 
screaming and crying; that her whole home was upset; that 
when the airport started operating she was well. She said 
'The noise from the airplanes, when I hear them from the 
beginning, when they start coming off the runway and into 
the field, they start the motors up, I hear them, they come 
closer and closer to the house and I see them and my stomach 
goes-I don't know, it just goes upside down sometimes, and 
sometimes I vomit. My stomach feels like the insides are just 
turned upside down-my health is-what are we going to 
do?' There was considerable testimony along the same gen-
eral lines. This record supports the conclusion of the trial 
court that the operation of the field and the flying of the 
planes as usually and normally occurring constituted a pri-
vate nuisance and that in view of the increasing use of the 
field this nuisance would continue and be aggravated. Both 
Souza and Earlandson testified that they had continually 
done all they could to prevent improper flying and it is a 
fair inference that they either cannot or will not abate the 
nuisance themselves. This is significant in view of the fact 
838 ANDERSON v. SouzA [38 C.2d 
that the action had been filed on August 7, 1947, and the case 
was tried beginning May 18, 1948. 
[11] ''An airport is not a nuisance per se, but that it may 
become a nuisance either because of unsuitable location or 
improper operation or both has been clearly decided. (Thrasher 
v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 [173 S.E. 817, 99 A.L.R. 158]; 
2 C.J.S. (Aerial Navigation), § 29, p. 909.) Our Legislature 
in 194 7 passed a State Aeronautics Commission Act. It 
therein declared that, 'Flight in aircraft over the lands and 
waters of this State is lawful, unless at altitudes below those 
prescribed by federal authority, or unless so conducted as to 
be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on 
the land or water beneath.' (State Aeronautics Com. Act, 
§ 2(d), ch. 1379, Stats. 1947, 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
151a.) [12] While this act had not gone into effect when 
the action before us was begun it went into effect approxi-
mately one month thereafter and since the injunctive proc-
esses of the court are prospective in operation it was appli-
cable to this feature of the case. The licensing and regulation 
of airports, subject to federal control, is committed by the 
act to the State Aeronautics Commission. [13] Neverthe-
less the licensing of the airport by the commission does not 
confer the right to so operate the port as to constitute a pri-
vate nuisance to surrounding property owners. 
" ' ... A license granted by a state aeronautics commis-
sion for the operation of an airport does not confer upon 
the proprietor thereof the right to operate it in such a manner 
as to constitute it a private nuisance.' (2 C.J.S. (Aerial Navi-
gation) § 29, p. 909.) 
"While apparently no formal license had up to the time 
of trial been granted to this airport, nevertheless since it was 
operative prior to June 30, 1947, it comes under the so-called 
'grandfather clause' of the State Aeronautics Commission Act, 
Section 17, which provides that 'Airport site approvals shall 
be granted and airport permits shall be issued for any im-
proved airports in use or ready for use on June 30, 1947.' 
We shall treat the airport as a licensed or permitted airport. 
[14] "Further, as to the effect of regulations concerning 
flying operations, it has been held that such regulations 
do not determine the rights of the surface owners as to nui-
sance. (Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., [C.C.A. Ohio] 
55 F.2d201, 203 [83 A.L.R. 319]), a ruling which is in line 
with the general principle above stated that permits and 
licenses are not to be considered as granting leave to maintain 
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a private nuisance. It is not controlling that the federal 
government has declared that the United States of America 
possesses and exercises complete and exclusive national sover-
eignty in the air space above the United States (U.S.C.A., 
title 49, § 176a) and that our Legislature has said 'It is fur-
ther declared that sovereignty in the space above the lands 
and waters of this State is declared to rest in the State, except 
where granted to and assumed by the United States pursuant 
to a constitutional grant from the people of the State' (State 
Aeronautics Com. Act, § 2 (b)), for it must be said that these 
declarations were not intended to and do not divest owners 
of the surface of the soil of their lawful rights incident to 
ownership. 
'' 'There is no definite yardstick that may be used in deter-
mining how low an airplane may fly over the property of 
others in landing or taking off; however, flying at low altitudes 
incident to landing and taking off may constitute trespass, 
as it may cause more than mere apprehension of injury. And, 
extensive low flying, causing unreasonable annoyanee to oceu-
pants of land below, is a substantial interferenee with enjoy-
ment of the property.' (Brandes v. JJ1itterling, 67 Ariz. 349 
[196 P.2d 464].) 
[15] "The regulatory provisions of the State Aeronauties 
Commission Act and the federal laws referred to do 'not sup-
plant the aneient common law and long-established statute law 
deelaring that nuisanees may be abated at the suit of those 
injured thereby. Restatement of the Law of Torts, seetion 
194, provides: 
'' 'An entry above the surfaee of the earth, in the air 
spaee in the possession of another, by a person who is travel-
ing in an aireraft, is privileged if the flight is condueted 
'' ' (a) for the purpose of travel through the air spaee 
or for any other legitimate purpose, 
" ' (b) in a reasonable manner, 
'' ' (e) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably 
with the possessor's enjoyment of the surfaee of the earth 
and the air space above it, and 
"'(d) in conformity with such regulations of the State 
and federal aeronautieal authorities as are in force in the 
particular State.' 
"But: 
" 'Under the rule stated in this Section, only those flights 
are privileged which are eonducted at such a height as not 
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unreasonably to interfere with the possessory interest in the 
land. Thus, a flight, although otherwise conducted in a reason-
able manner, for a legitimate purpose, and in conformity 
with all applicable local regulations, if conducted at such a 
low height as to cause reasonable fear or substantial annoy-
ance to occupants of the land or to frighten cattle or other 
animals thereon in such a way as to cause them harm, or to 
endanger the surface of the land, or persons, trees, structures 
or other things thereon, or to interfere with the possessor's 
legitimate use of the air space, is not within the privilege.' 
(Comment on clause (c) of § 194.) 
''As illustrative of the general trend of judicial decisions 
upon the subject hereof see the following: Thrasher v. City 
of Atlanta, supra (judgment reversed with directions to issue 
injunction against continued spreading of dust in excessive 
or unreasonable quantities over adjoining residential prop-
erty; Bur·nham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628 [ 42 
N.E.2d 575) (decree affirmed, upholding injunction against 
flying below height of 500 feet over residence 2,800 feet from 
city-controlled, but privately-operated, airport); Mohican & 
Reena, Inc. v. Tobiasz, 1938 U.S.Av.Rep. 1 (injunction granted 
at suit of owner of summer camp for children· against flying 
below 1,000 feet within 500 feet of camp) ; Vanderslice v. 
Shawn, 26 Del.Ch. 225 [27 A.2d 87) (residents entitled to an 
injunction against owners of private airport from permitting 
flights at less that 100 feet of adjacent dwellings) ; Alhambra 
Airport case, 13 J. of Air L. & Com. 138 (injunction at suit of 
taxpayers and board of education prohibiting further use of 
private airport for pilot training and limiting future use to 
emergency landings and actual business needs of two aircraft 
manufacturing plants located at airport) ; Dlugos v. United Air 
Lines, 1944 U.S.Av.Rep. (Ct. Com. Pl. Pa. Lehigh Co., 1944) 
airline enjoined from operating planes at altitudes below 100 
feet over plaintiff's fields adjacent to municipal airport, on 
days when plaintiff engaged in farming such fields, not to ex-
ceed10 days during following year, provided five hours' writ-
ten notice given airline at its office) ; Swetland v. Curtis Air-
ports Corp., s~tpra (airport completely abated by circuit 
court, notwithstanding refusal of trial court to do so.) 
''A further contention is made that the trial court still was 
not authorized to enjoin the further operation of the airport 
and necessarily must have limited its injunctive order to 
prevention of the nuisance existing; that this could be done 
without forbidding all operation of the airport. [16] In-
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junctive process ought never to go beyond the necessities of 
the case and where a legitimate business is being conducted 
and in the conduct thereof a nuisance has been created and 
is being maintained, the relief granted should be directed 
and confined to the elimination of the nuisance, unless under 
the peculiar circumstances of the case the business, lawful in 
itself, cannot be conducted without creating a nuisance and 
violating the rights of contiguous property owners. In Vow-
inckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 162 [13 P.2d 733], 
in a case involving a decree ordering defendant to cease oper-
ating a number of pottery kilns, the court said: 
" 'In the present case the court appears to have given due 
consideration to the situation of the defendant. This is ap-
parent from the fact that it refused to abate entirely the 
defendant's operations and granted the relief sought to the 
extent necessary to preserve the rights of both parties. In 
other words the court, in the exercise of its equity powers, 
has compared consequences and has considered the injuries 
resulting to each party, on the one hand if the injunction 
be wholly denied, and on the other if it be granted. The 
court, from the evidence presented, gave heed to the rule 
that in a proper case it will not enjoin the conduct of the 
defendant's entire business, where such business is not a 
nuisance per se, if a less measure of restriction will afford 
to the plaintiff the relief to which he may be entitled. (Mc-
Menamy v. Baud, 87 Cal. 134 [26 P. 795] ; Tuebner v. Cali-
fornia St. R. Co., 66 Cal. 171 [4 P. 1162]; Williams v. Blue 
Bird Laundry Co., supra [85 Cal.App. 388 (259 P. 484)] ; 
Mcintosh v. Brimmer, supra [68 Oal.App. 770 (230 P. 203) J .) ' 
"In this case it is apparent from the memorandum opinion 
written by the able trial judge, on motion for new trial, that 
it was his conclusion nothing short of complete abatement 
would preserve the rights of respondents and he attributed 
this principally to the shortness of the runway. The learned 
trial judge said: 
" 'The third contention, that the injunction was too broad, 
is a more difficult question. Ordinarily it is true that a lawful 
act should not be enjoined; that all that should be enjoined 
is the commission of the act in such a way as to constitute 
a nuisance; in other words, that only the nuisance should be 
enjoined. Under that interpretation, defendants ask to be 
allowed to continue operations provided they commit no 
nuisance. But in the Court's opinion, that is impossible. The 
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continued operation of that field in its present condition, 
according to the evidence, must inevitably result in continu-
ance of the nuisance. The field is entirely too small to avoid 
the nuisance; and the runway is too close to the homes of some 
of the plaintiffs.' 
[17] "Pertinent to the problem now being discussed is 
the nature of the airfield involved. It is a private airfield 
which cannot exercise the power of condemnation and the 
establishment of which requires no finding by any public 
agency of public convenience and necessity. [18] The own-
ers and operators of such an airport, notwithstanding they 
are engaged in a legitimate business, the encouragement and 
furtherance of which is a publicly-declared policy of our 
Legislature (State .Aeronautics Com . .Act, § 2(a)) [see, also, 
Deering's Gen. Laws, .Acts 153c and 153e] must nevertheless 
conduct it with due regard for the rights of others, and if 
because of location the operation of such a business will result 
in depriving others of their property rights, . it cannot be 
permitted, for to do so would, in practical effect, condemn 
the property of others in violation of constitutional guaran-
tees. (Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 
239 [118 P. 928, 38 L.R..A.N.S. 436].) 
''The distinction between a public and private use as re-
gards the use of injunctive process is pointed out in New 
York City v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93 [22 S.Ct. 592, 46 L.Ed. 820], 
wherein the Supreme Court of the United States recognized 
the principle that, where the defendant in an injunction 
suit has the ultimate right, that is to say, where it is entitled 
to continue with its work by eminent domain proceedings, a 
permanent injunction will be denied, but a temporary injunc-
tion may be granted to compel the defendant to make com-
pensation. The State .Aeronautics Commission .Act contem-
plates the furtherance of aviation, with its manifold benefits 
to the public, by operation of both public and private fields, 
but with respect to the public fields it provides for their es-
tablishment by counties, cities and other municipal agencies, 
requires the finding of public convenience and necessity and 
contemplates the use of the power of condemnation. No such 
power is given or could be given to those putting their prop-
erty to private use, even though incidentally the general pur-
poses of the act are thereby subserved. [19] We conclude 
there is nothing to distinguish a private airport from any other 
private business with regard to enjoining operations which 
create a nuisance. 
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''However, we are still confronted with the final question 
of whether or not the record here and the findings of the 
trial court itself support the issuanee of the decree com-
pletely forbidding the continued use of the property involved 
as an airfield. 
"The allegations in the complaint which have been hereto-
fore stated indicate clearly that it is the way in which the 
flying has been done that constitutes the nuisance complained 
of. Considering these allegations, the following things must 
be said: That buzzing, stunting and engaging in acrobatics 
can be prohibited without difficulty. The allegations that 
planes taxi, take off, circle, cruise about, maneuver, glide, 
climb, bank and turn are descriptions of ordinary and neces-
sary actions in flying a plane, not objectionable unless con-
ducted in such close proximity to plaintiffs' homes as to 
constitute a nuisance. It is the way they are being done and 
not the doing of them in and of itself which is the cause for 
complaint. It is the doing of these things at such low altitudes 
and in such close proximity to plaintiffs' homes and property 
that is the gravamen of the cause. Limits could be placed 
upon the doing of these acts which would eliminate the nui-
sance. [20] Plaintiffs also plead that 'the only available 
remedy to Plaintiffs, . . . is a permanent injunction restrain-
ing the Defendants permanently from operating the said air-
port as an airport,' but this is said to be necessary 'because 
of the peculiar acts of the Defendants.' While all these alle-
gations were found to be true by the trial court we think that 
neither the pleadings nor the findings justify the complete 
abatement of the enterprise; and that the testimony does not 
support the extreme decree granted." 
[21] Defendants maintained throughout the case that their 
ordinary operations did not constitute a nuisance and there-
fore offered no evidence or suggestions as to how the airport 
could be operated without constituting a nuisance. Although 
they were in error in concluding that their operations did not 
constitute a nuisance, the burden was on plaintiffs who sought 
to close the airport to prove that no planes could fly to and 
from the field at proper elevations. 
"No witness testified planes could not fly to and from the 
field and still fly at such elevations as would eliminate the 
nuisance factor which now exists. [22] Contiguous prop-
erty owners must to a reasonable degree yield their desired 
privacy to the general welfare which is contributed to by the 
operation of legitimate businesses. Were it not so, railroads 
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could not operate near residences, and factories could not be 
established without the necessity of purchasing prohibitively 
large areas of property. That reasonable inconvenience must 
be suffered by owners whose holdings are contiguous to com-
mercial enterprises is too well decided to require citation of 
authorities. The evidence shows that the length of the runway 
here, while approximating the lowest limit fixed by federal 
authority, yet does exceed that limit. [23] We are aware 
that airplanes necessarily ascend and descend on rising and 
descending planes and that where a runway is too short to 
permit them to ascend or descend over contiguous property 
without invading the lawful right of the surface owner to the 
air above his holdings their flight would constitute an unlaw-
ful act. Nevertheless there is no testimony here that the 
runway is so short that no planes could lawfully operate 
from the field. That such was the situation in the opinion 
of the learned trial judge appears from that part of his 
written opinion which we have quoted, but the evidence does 
not sustain that position. We think, therefore, that upon 
this record here, considering the evidence, the pleadings and 
the findings, the decree rendered went beyond permissible 
limits. · [24] 'It may be that the imposition of appropriate 
limitations will, by reason of the shortness of the runway, 
and the prevailing flying conditions, make it impossible for 
the airfield to be operated in a normal and usual manner, 
but that has not been shown; and until it is the injunction 
forbidding all operations from the field cannot be sustained. 
It may be difficult, but we think it is not impossible for the 
trial court either upon the evidence now in the record, or to 
be taken, to frame a decree which will eliminate the nuisance 
that has been shown to exist. . . . '' For example, flight over 
the homes of plaintiffs at elevations below those set by federal 
authority could be forbidden; flight by flyers unable to comply 
with such a regulation by reason of inexperience could be 
forbidden; use of the airport by any type or size of aircraft 
for which the court on competent evidence finds the airport 
inadequate, could be forbidden; flight except during daylight 
hours could be forbidden if necessary; if defendants cannot 
comply with such restrictions all operations from the field 
could be forbidden. Complete abatement of the enterprise 
is undoubtedly the result plaintiffs desire, but, in the absence 
of a showing that the airport and flying school could not be 
operated in such a way as not to constitute a nuisance, com-
plete abatement is beyond the rights of plaintiffs .. 
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The advance of aeronautical science may make use of the 
field possible without injury to plaintiffs, by aircraft that 
can operate without making unduly low and noisy flights. 
Defendants may acquire additional land and extend their run-
way. Upon a proper showing of changed circumstances, the 
trial court may modify or dissolve the injunction. (Sontag 
Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 92 [113 P.2d 
689); see cases collected in 28 Am.Jur. 485-495.) 
The judgment for damages is affirmed. The judgment is 
reversed as to plaintiffs C. H. Ter:ry, Oma Terry, H. E. 
Fletcher, Dorothy Fletcher, ·william T. Harrison, Grace 
Harrison, Frank Baba, and Zale Wooters. That part of 
the judgment enjoining and restraining the defendants from 
operating the airport on the premises is reversed and the 
cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 
in harmony with the views expressed in this opinion. Costs 
are awarded to plaintiffs. 
SCHAUER, J.-Concurring and Dissenting. 
I concur in the reversal of the judgment as to plaintiffs 
Terry, Fletcher, Harrison, Baba and Wooters, and in the 
reversal of the part of the judgment which restrains defend-
ants from operating the airport. I agree that the cause should 
be remanded for further proceedings in accord with the view 
that'' Contiguous property owners must to a reasonable degree 
yield their desired privacy to the general welfare which is 
contributed to by the operation of legitimate businesses. Were 
it not so, railroads could not operate near residences, and 
factories could not be established without the necessity of 
purchasing prohibitively large areas of property. That rea-
sonable inconvenience must be suffered by owners whose hold-
ings are contiguous to commercial enterprises is too well 
decided to require citation of authorities.'' 
An airport is just as lawful, just as much in the public 
interest and as necessary for its convenience, as a garage or 
a service station, and a school of aeronautics is just as lawful 
and serves the public interest as truly as any other school 
which teaches a useful art or science or craft. Such activities 
may constitute ''a substantial interference with enjoyment 
of the property'' which is in proximity to the places where 
they are carried on, but it is only an interference which is 
unreasonable under all the circumstances that can be en-
joined. (See, e.g., Nagel v. Darrington (1927), 202 Cal. 698, 
700 [262 P. 718], refusing to enjoin operation of garage and 
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service station in the absence of a showing that "it is operated 
in some extraordinary manner so as to be a nuisance because 
of such operation.'') 
I dissent from the affirmance of the judgment for damages 
against Souza, owner of the airstrip, and his wife. In my 
opinion the evidence does not support the findings that the 
Souzas operated the airport and that Souza operated "many" 
planes from it. Souza testified that he did not operate the 
airport; that he had leased it to Earlandson, who, under the 
terms of the lease, had the exclusive right to operate it. Mr. 
Souza collected rent fro~n Earlandson and from the owners 
of some 18 planes which were kept at the field. There is no 
evidence that Souza controlled the operation of ·these planes 
which regularly occupied space at the airport or that these 
particular planes were operated in a manner which was 
legitimately objectionable to any plaintiff. Souza did not lease 
the land for any improper purpose; he leased it for the 
lawful, useful purposes of the operation of a flying school, 
the storing of planes, and the servicing of planes which used 
the field. Souza did not operate "many" planes; he owned 
and operated only one plane and there is no evidence that 
he himself ever used his airport or his airplane unlawfully 
or in such a manner as to interfere with any plaintiff's use 
and enjoyment of plaintiffs' land. 
Would it be reasonable to hold that the owner of property 
used as a garage, for the storing and repair of automobiles, 
is to be liable for damages and for abatement of the use of 
his property if owners of the automobiles stored or serviced 
at his garage drive them on the highways in such a manner 
as to violate the law and constitute a nuisance~ If the owner 
of garage property is not to be held to such an extended 
degree of responsibility for the independent acts of his patrons 
then neither should the owner of an airport. The liability 
here of Mr. and Mrs. Souza rests on no better foundation. 
It is relatively but a few years since courts-and, of course, 
the citizenry at large who brought the cases to court-were 
struggling with a new concept: the use of public highways 
by self-propelled vehicles. Illustrative of the difficulties en-
countered then is Nason v. West (1900), 31 Misc. 583 [65 
N.Y.S. 651, 652-653], an action for damages which resulted 
when plaintiffs' horse was frightened by defendant's carefully 
driven motor carriage. The court said : "It will not do to 
say that it is proper to run any kind of a contrivance upon 
the street, in which persons may be carried. A machine that 
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would go puffing and snorting through the streets, trailing 
clouds of steam and smoke, might be a nuisance; but this is 
not such a case. It cannot be said that the defendant's machine 
is such a departure in its construction or mode of operation 
from other steam motor carriages, which experience has lately 
shown to be entirely practicable for street use, as to make it a 
nuisance, although, because of the present novelty of horseless 
carriages, horses may take fright at its approach." Judgment 
for the plaintiffs was reversed. 
The thought that privately owned automobiles might be 
generally barred from public highways is now archaic. So 
also is the thought that privately owned surface vessels might 
be generally barred from the use of navigable waters. But 
there are still many people who have not yet accepted the 
concept that the navigable sea of the air is a public domain 
and that ''Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of 
this state is lawful, unless at altitudes below those prescribed 
by federal authority, or unless so conducted as to be immi-
nently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land 
or water beneath." (State Aeronautics Com. Act, § 2 (b), ch. 
1379, Stats. 1947, 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 151a.) Only 
a couple of decades ago pilots often heard the statement (which 
almost became an adage) that "One doesn't have to be crazy 
to fly but it helps.'' There are people who still believe this. 
But the magnificent records of safe, speedy and comfortable 
transportation through the use of airplanes, made by both 
airline companies and conservative private owners, have dis-
proved the "adage." 
The published records of the Civil Aeronautics Authority 
disclose that (as of February 1, 1952) there were 88,275 civil 
aircraft registered in the United States, of which 1,258 were 
scheduled air carrier aircraft and 87,017 were privately owned 
and operated in other than scheduled air carrier operations. 
Every one of these 88,275 airplanes must have airports from 
and to which to operate; the utility of each can be no greater 
than the available take off and landing facilities. By reason 
of size, weight and other limitations, the 1,258 scheduled air 
carrier aircraft are limited to the use of relatively very large 
and highly improved airports but the great majority of the 
87,017 privately owned and operated airplanes are built to 
take off and land on much smaller fields. The loss of any 
approved and established airport-small or large-is a loss 
to the people of the entire state. As declared in ''California 
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Airport Study" ( 1950), prepared by the California Aero-
nautics Commission, ''Aviation's part in California's growth 
is large. The State has accepted the aircraft as an important 
means of transportation, and as a new tool of agriculture. 
Airports must be provided on a permanent and equitable 
basis. Detailed study of the inventory of the State's airports 
and careful consideration of the specific needs of the various 
counties and cities, individually and collectively, leads to cer-
tain broad conclusions. These are: 
''An airport is a part of a state-wide transportation system 
and serves all of the people of the State-not just those 
who live in the immediate vicinity of the terminal. 
"The 'highway system of the air' will not give full service 
nor show adequate returns until it is completed. 
''To keep California abreast of national progress a definite, 
integrated, program must be instituted to establish the system. 
"The problem confronting the people of the State of Cali-
fornia at the present time is the establishment of a SYSTEM 
of airports on a permanent basis in order to realize the full 
benefit to be derived from aviation. 
''The terrain will force the use of the airplane for rapid 
and economic travel in many areas. The distances between 
the State's major areas of population will demand transporta-
tion means faster than can be accomplished on the surface. 
''Many airports are needed to adequately serve populated 
areas. 
''Airports are needed to give access to the many fine 
existing recreational areas, and to develop others that are 
not otherwise accessible. 
''Isolated airports are required to complete the system. 
''Some airports are needed to save lives.'' 
Returning more particularly to the law applicable to this 
case I would emphasize that neither noise alone (see Smith 
v. New England Aircraft Co. (1930), 270 Mass. 511 [170 
N.E. 385, 69 A.L.R. 300, 306] ; Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey 
(1942), 193 Ga. 862 [20 S.E.2d 245, 140 A.L.R. 1352, 1356]; 
Crew v. Gallagher (1948), 358 Pa. 541, 548 [58 A.2d 179]), 
nor mere apprehension of danger of falling airplanes (see 
Thrasher v. Atlanta (1934), 178 Ga. 514 [173 S.E. 817, 99 
A.L.R. 158, 163] ; Batcheller v. Commonwealth (1940), 176 
Va. 109, 117 [10 S.E.2d 529] )-the two elements of which 
particular complaint is made in the testimony of those plain-
tiffs who took the stand in support of the allegations of the 
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complaint- are sufficient grounds for enjoining the operation 
of an airport. 
In the state of the evidence here I would hold that the 
Souzas are within the rule of such cases as Meloy v. City of 
Santa Monica (1932), 124 Cal.App. 622, 627 [12 P.2d 1072], 
and Mundt v. Nowlin (1941), 44 Cal.App.2d 414, 416 [112 
P.2d 782), that a landlord is not liable for a nuisance created 
by lessees who have leased the land for lawful and proper 
purposes. It was not shown that a nuisance is a necessary 
consequence of the operation of the flying school and airport 
here. The lessor should not be liable for their operation in 
a manner which he did not contemplate and to which he did 
not consent. 
Earlandson states that he has no objection to any unlawful . 
or improper actions being enjoined. Earlandson is liable ) 
only for unlawful use of the airport which he could control. 
Since there is evidence tending to show that planes of 
Earlandson 's flying school, inferentially controlled by him, 
often passed over the land of plaintiffs at unnecessarily low 
altitudes when taking off, the finding against Earlandson on 
this point can be upheld, but the relief adjudged against him 
should go no further than the ends of equity, upon the proof, 
may require. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with everything in the majority opmwn of this 
court except its conclusion that a permanent injunction should 
not have been granted. The trial judge who heard the evi-
dence, saw the witnesses, and viewed the maps and photo-
graphs, was of the opinion that the airfield could not be so 
operated that it would not constitute a continuing nuisance 
as to plaintiffs. 
Inherent in the majority opinion is the premise that plain-
tiffs had clearly shown that a nuisance existed as it un-
doubtedly did and will continue to exist. The trial court 
was of the opinion that the continued operation of the field 
"in 1:ts present condition, according to the evidence, (note 
that it was not only the manner in which the planes were 
operated) must inevitably result in continuance of the nui-
sance. The field is entirely too small to avoid the nuisance; 
and the runway is too close to the homes of some of the 
plaintiffs." (Italics added.) Having heard the evidence, the 
trial judge was in a position to know that a permanent m-
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junction was necessary to preserve the rights of these plaintiffs . 
.A majority of this court, however, feels that this is much too 
drastic a step and reverses that portion of the judgment. 
The landing strip on the airfield is laid out diagonally. The 
airstrip is 2,000 feet in length, just 200 feet beyond the 
minimum permitted by the United States Civil .Aeronautics 
.Administration. The majority states that there is no testi-
mony to show that the runway is so short that planes could 
not lawfully operate from the field. .Apparently the testimony 
was all to the effect that no planes did lawfully operate from 
the field and it is stated by a majority of this court that 
although defendants testified "that they had continually done 
all they could to prevent improper flying . . . it is a fair 
inference that they either cannot or will not abate the nuisance 
themselves. This is significant in view of the fact that the 
action had been filed on .August 7, 1947, and the case was 
tried beginning May 18, 1948." (Italics added.) It is con-
ceded that a nuisance existed; that the plaintiffs proved their 
case, but the judgment granting a permanent injunction is 
reversed. The reason assigned for this conclusion is that 
plaintiffs have not shown that it is impossible for the airfield 
to be "operated in a normal and usual manner." If this 
is stated in another way, it means that plaintiffs are required 
to prove what defendants sh01lld be required to prove: That 
the airport can be so operated as not to create a nuisance. 
The injunction having been granted, it appears to me that 
it is now up to the defendants to prove that they are prepared 
to so operate their admittedly lawful business as to comply 
with the regulations this court has decided will constitute 
a lawful operation thereof. For example, "flight over the 
homes of plaintiffs at elevations below those set by federal 
authority cmlld be forbidden; flight by flyers unable to comply 
with such a regulation by reason of inexperience could be 
forbidden; use of the airport by any type or size of aircraft 
for which the court on competent evidence finds the airport 
inadequate, could be forbidden; flight except during daylight 
hours could be forbidden if necessary''; and ''the advance 
of aeronautical science may make use of the field possible 
without injury to plaintiffs . . . defendants may acquire 
additional land and extend their runway." And, as a com-
plete answer, it is stated that "upon a proper showing of 
changed circumstances, the trial court may modify or dissolve 
the injunction" -this undoubtedly refers to the "further 
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proceedings in harmony with the views expressed in the (ma-
jority) opinion.'' (Italics added.) 
It appears to me that under the "views expressed," plain-
tiffs now must show defendants how to try to lawfully operate 
their airfield. 'l'hen, if the nuisance continues to exist, they 
must again go to court, prove the existence of the nuisance 
and receive money damages and a permanent injunction 
which would, in turn, probably be again reversed by a ma-
jority of this court. Up until now, it had always been my 
understanding that a single suit in equity took the place of 
many successive suits at law for damages with the court of 
equity ending by injunction the violation of the plaintiff's 
rights which, together with recovery of damages sustained, 
settled the entire controversy in a single suit. Damages are 
clearly inadequate here; a permanent injunction is the only 
thing which will give plaintiffs the relief they seek, and the 
only thing which will prevent a multiplicity of suits. 
It appears to me that the result reached by a majority 
of this court is in direct conflict with the usual procedure. 
It is uniformly recognized that where a final or permanent 
injunction has been granted, the court which granted it may 
dissolve or modify it where changes in circumstances or con-
ditions warrant it (Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, (Mont.) 116 P.2d 1012, 136 A.L.R. 757; Ladner 
v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487 [148 A. 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172]; Washing-
ton Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, (Idaho) 24 
F.Supp. 790; Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court, 18 
Cal.2d 92 [113 P.2d 689] ; J[elley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337 [190 
A. 140]; Hodges v. Snyde1·, 45 S.D. 149 [186 N.W. 867, 25 
A.L.R. 1128], 261 U.S. 600 [43 S.Ct. 435, 67 L.Ed. 819]; 
Equity, deFuniak, § 8, p. 19.) 
In the Sontag case (p. 94), this court in discussing a per-
manent injunction had this to say: ''This is so because the 
decree, although purporting on its face to be permanent, is 
in essence of an executory or continuing nature, creating no 
right but merely assuming to protect a right from unlawful 
and injurious interference. Such a decree, it has uniformly 
been held, is always subject, upon a proper showing, to modi-
fication or dissolution by the court which rendered it. The 
court's power in this respect is an inherent one." This would 
appear to be particularly applicable to the instant case. When, 
and if, the defendants can show that they are able to so 
operate their airfield as to respect plaintiffs' property rights, 
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then the court which granted the injunction may modify or 
dissolve it. This procedure places the burden where it be-
longs-on the ones who have created, and who continue to 
create, the nuisance complained of. The numerous ways in 
which the airport could be operated so as not to interfere 
with plaintiffs' rights (as pointed out in the majority opinion, 
and which I have heretofore set forth) would seem to be 
innovations which defendants could put into practice before 
applying for modification or dissolution of the injunction. 
In effect, the majority says to plaintiffs: You have proven 
sufficient facts to show that the manner in which defendants 
have operated their airport constitutes a nuisance, and you 
have been damaged thereby, but defendants may be able to 
change their method of .operation so as to eliminate the ob-
jectionable features and thereby discontinue the nuisance. 
Therefore, without any assurance that defendants will do 
so, we will deprive you of the protection afforded by the 
injunction and will force yott to again apply to the trial 
court for such protection, and if the trial court grants it, 
we may again reverse the judgment, in the hope that de-
fendants may, at some time in the future, change their method 
of operation so as to make their operation lawful. This may 
continue ad infinitum. 
The holding of the majority in this case marks a clear 
departure from the settled course of procedure, as it places 
the burden on plaintiffs to press their claim for relief or 
suffer from the continuance of the nuisance. As I have 
hereinabove pointed out, if the injunctive provisions of the 
instant judgment are affirmed, defendants are not thereby 
prevented from so changing their method of operation as to 
eliminate the nuisance, if this can be done. At such time 
they may apply to the court for such relief as they may be 
entitled. to receive. In the meantime, plaintiffs are protected 
from the continuance of the nuisance and the consequent 
damage to their property which the injunction was issued to 
prevent. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment. 
